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I. INTRODUCTION 
Before the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. 
Washington,1 Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was a muddled and 
unsettled area of constitutional law that often merged with 
evidentiary hearsay rules. In Crawford, however, the Court redefined 
the purpose of the Confrontation Clause2 by emphasizing the right of 
the defendant to test evidence against him in the “crucible of cross-
examination.”3 In a string of recent cases, the Court has continued on 
this trajectory, delineating the scope of its newly developed 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. In Williams v. Illinois,4 the Court 
will have the opportunity to do so again, this time by focusing on the 
admissibility of forensic evidence through expert testimony. Williams 
offers the Court yet another opportunity to apply the recently 
developed doctrine, to strengthen the essential right afforded by the 
Sixth Amendment, and to ensure the continued viability of the 
Crawford test. 
II. FACTS 
On the evening of February 10, 2000, 22-year-old L.J. was walking 
home from her job at a Chicago clothing store when a man came up 
behind her and forced her to sit in the backseat of a beige station 
 
* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Id. 
 3.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
 4.  Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505 (U.S. argued Dec. 6, 2011). 
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wagon.5 The man told her to take off her clothes and then vaginally 
penetrated L.J. while choking her.6 After the assault, the man pushed 
L.J. out of the car and drove away with her coat, money, and other 
items.7 L.J. then ran home, where her mother called the police.8 
When the police officers arrived, L.J. told them what had 
transpired and was then transported to the emergency room.9 There, 
Dr. Nancy Schubert performed a vaginal exam and took vaginal 
swabs, which she placed into a sexual assault evidence collection kit 
along with a sample of L.J.’s blood.10 On February 15, the Illinois State 
Police (ISP) Crime Lab received the kit and performed tests that 
confirmed the presence of semen.11 
Six months later, police arrested the defendant for an unrelated 
offense and, pursuant to a court order, collected a blood sample.12 
Forensic scientist Karen Kooi performed an analysis on the sample, 
extracted a DNA profile for the defendant, and entered it into the 
database at the ISP Crime Lab.13 Meanwhile, the samples from L.J.’s 
sexual assault kit had been sent to Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory 
for DNA analysis.14 Cellmark derived a DNA profile for L.J.’s alleged 
rapist.15 Finally, ISP forensic biologist Sandra Lambatos received the 
DNA profile from Cellmark, compared it to the DNA profile she 
received from Karen Kooi, and concluded that the two profiles were a 
match.16 When L.J. identified the defendant in a line-up nearly eight 
months later,17 the defendant was arrested for the alleged offenses.18 
At trial, Lambatos testified that it was “a commonly accepted 
practice in the scientific community for one DNA expert to rely on 
the records of another DNA analyst to complete her work,” and that 
she relied on Cellmark’s testing and analysis to inform her opinion in 
this case.19 Over defense counsel’s objections, Lambatos then testified 
 
 5.  People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ill. 2010). 
 6.  Brief for Respondent at 1, Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2011). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Williams, 939 N.E.2d at 270. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 270–71. 
 14.  Id. at 271. 
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
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that, in her expert opinion, the DNA from the semen recovered on 
L.J.’s vaginal swab matched the defendant’s DNA.20 Although 
Cellmark’s report informed Lambatos’s testimony and conclusion, the 
report itself was not introduced into evidence.21 The trial court denied 
the defendant’s motion to strike the evidence of Cellmark’s testing on 
Sixth Amendment grounds.22 Thereafter, the trial court found the 
defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual assault and one 
count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery.23 
On appeal, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
results of Cellmark’s testing and analysis were testimonial in nature 
and Lambatos’s expert testimony—relying on those results—violated 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.24 The 
appellate court held that “Cellmark’s report was not offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was offered to provide a basis 
for Lambatos’[s] opinion.”25 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that 
decision,26 stating that because the Confrontation Clause does not bar 
the admission of testimonial statements admitted for purposes other 
than proving the truth of the matter asserted,27 the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right was not violated.28 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.”29 The relationship between exceptions 
to the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause has often raised 
difficult questions for courts.30 The Supreme Court has, in recent 
terms, attempted to address these questions and to refine the scope of 
the Confrontation Clause, beginning in 2004 with Crawford v. 
Washington.31 
 
 20.  Id. at 272. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 273. 
 24.  People v. Williams, 895 N.E.2d 961, 969–70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Williams, 939 N.E.2d at 282. 
 27.  Id. at 277. 
 28.  Id. at 282. 
 29.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 30.  See, e.g., Ian Volek, Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Back Door and the 
Confrontation Clause, Ten Years Later, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 963–64 (2011) (evaluating 
Rule 703’s intersection with other rules of evidence and Confrontation Clause jurisprudence). 
 31.  E.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 
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In Crawford, the Supreme Court sought to define the illusory 
terms contained within the Sixth Amendment.32 Under Crawford, a 
“witness against” a defendant is defined as one who “bear[s] 
testimony.”33 “Testimony,” in turn, is defined as a “solemn declaration 
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.”34 Crawford held that the Sixth Amendment’s primary concern is 
with “testimonial hearsay.”35 The Confrontation Clause, therefore, bars 
only testimonial statements that are admitted for the purpose of 
proving the truth of the matter asserted.36 By establishing this test, 
Crawford overruled the 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts37 and its 
progeny, which permitted testimonial hearsay statements if the 
defendant was unavailable and the statements bore adequate “indicia 
of reliability.”38 Crawford emphasized that the reliability of evidence 
was not an adequate substitute for “testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”39 Thus, the new test transformed the Confrontation 
Clause from a substantive reliability rule to a procedural guarantee.40 
The Crawford decision, though offering a laundry list of examples, 
left open the debate on exactly what type of statements qualified as 
“testimonial.”41 This question was later explored by the Court in Davis 
v. Washington,42 which concerned the admissibility of statements made 
to the police during or immediately after an emergency.43 In Davis, the 
Court established a primary purpose test, defining statements made 
during an interrogation as testimonial when “the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution.”44 The Court’s recent decision 
 
(2006); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 32.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 33.  Id. (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828)). 
 34.  Id. (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 33). 
 35.  Id. at 53. 
 36.  Id. at 59 n.9. 
 37.  448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 38.  Id. at 66. 
 39.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
 40.  See id. at 67 (“To be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure 
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, 
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in 
the crucible of cross-examination.”). 
 41.  Id. at 51–52.  
 42.  547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 43.  Id. at 817. 
 44.  Id. at 822. 
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in Michigan v. Bryant45 further clarified that the primary purpose test 
is an objective analysis of a reasonable participant and does not seek 
to determine the “subjective or actual purpose of the individuals 
involved in a particular encounter.”46 
The testimonial applications of the Confrontation Clause were 
again at issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,47 which addressed 
the admissibility of laboratory certificates of analysis when the testing 
analyst does not appear at trial.48 The Court in Melendez-Diaz found 
the sworn reports of state forensic analysts certifying that a tested 
substance was cocaine to be testimonial, and thus their admission 
without the testimony of the analysts violated the Confrontation 
Clause.49 The Court stated that because they were “quite plainly 
affidavits,” the certificates fell within the “core class of testimonial 
statements” described in Crawford.50 The affidavits were 
“incontrovertibly a ‘solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”51 Accordingly, the 
certificates were meant to serve as a substitute for live witness 
testimony,52 had no other purpose than for use at trial, and were 
therefore unquestionably testimonial in nature.53 
In Bullcoming v. New Mexico54—decided only a few days before 
the Court granted certiorari in the instant case—the “[p]rincipal 
evidence against [the defendant] was a forensic laboratory report 
certifying that [his] blood-alcohol concentration was well above the 
threshold for aggravated DWI.”55 At trial, the prosecution failed to 
call to the stand the analyst who performed the test and signed the 
report.56 Rather, the state called a different analyst who was 
knowledgeable about the testing device and laboratory procedures 
used but “had neither participated in nor observed the test on 
 
 45.  131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (holding that a statement given to police by a wounded crime 
victim is nontestimonial because the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police 
to deal with an ongoing emergency). 
 46.  Id. at 1156.  
 47.  129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 48.  Id. at 2531. 
 49.  Id. at 2532. 
 50.  Id. at 2531–32 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 51.  Id. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 55.  Id. at 2709. 
 56.  Id. 
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Bullcoming’s blood sample.”57 In Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the 
Court, she rejected New Mexico’s claim that the expert was simply 
reporting “a machine-generated number,” explaining that his 
representations as to procedure and protocol “relat[ed] to past events 
and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data” and 
were “meet for cross-examination.”58 
The Court then held that having a “surrogate” expert testify for 
the analyst did not satisfy the Confrontation Clause because the 
surrogate could not convey information about the specific test and 
testing procedure utilized, nor did he offer any “independent opinion” 
concerning the data.59 Further, surrogate testimony could not “expose 
any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s part.”60 Last, the Court 
held that “the formalities attending [the certificate were] more than 
adequate to qualify [the analyst’s] assertions as testimonial.”61 Thus, 
when New Mexico elected to introduce the test into evidence, the 
analyst who performed the test became a witness whom Bullcoming 
had a Sixth Amendment right to confront.62 
Justice Sotomayor, concurring in part, emphasized the limited 
reach of the Court’s opinion by eliciting four scenarios the decision 
did not address.63 The third of these scenarios—”a case in which an 
expert witness was asked for his independent opinion about 
underlying testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into 
evidence”64—is similar to the facts now before the Court in Williams v. 
Illinois. 
In Williams, the Court will have an opportunity to resolve a split 
on this question and to decide whether out-of-court statements 
presented to explain the basis of an expert witness’s opinion 
constitute hearsay. In addition to the Supreme Court of Illinois, 
another state supreme court, a state appellate court, and the Tenth 
Circuit have held that out-of-court statements relied upon by expert 
witnesses do not implicate a defendant’s confrontation rights because 
the statements are introduced not for their truth but to explain the 
 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 2714. 
 59.  Id. at 2715–16. 
 60.  Id. at 2715. 
 61.  Id. at 2717. 
 62.  Id. at 2716. 
 63.  Id. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 64.  Id. at 2722. 
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basis of the expert’s opinion.65 Conversely, the Second Circuit and two 
other state supreme courts have ruled in the opposite direction and 
held that the Confrontation Clause does not permit out-of-court 
testimonial statements to be presented through expert testimony.66 In 
reaching its decision, the Court will be forced to fill another gap in the 
Confrontation Clause analysis and to face the question of where to 
draw the line in applying Crawford and its progeny. 
IV. HOLDING 
In People v. Williams,67 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that 
because the State did not offer Sandra Lambatos’s testimony 
regarding the Cellmark report for the truth of the matter asserted, 
Williams’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated.68 The court 
emphasized that, after Crawford, the Confrontation Clause does not 
bar the admission of testimonial statements admitted for purposes 
other than proving the truth of the matter.69 
The court first examined whether the report at issue constituted 
hearsay.70 Under the defendant’s theory, the Cellmark report 
constituted hearsay because the State introduced it to establish the 
truth of the matter asserted.71 According to the defendant, without 
accepting the truth of Cellmark’s report, Lambatos could not have 
testified that the defendant’s DNA matched the profile provided by 
Cellmark.72 The State countered that Lambatos testified about the 
 
 65.  See United States v. Pablo, 625 F.3d 1285, 1294 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that experts 
may testify to the data and information produced by non-testifying analysts but not to the 
analysts’ ultimate conclusions); State v. Tucker, 160 P.3d 177, 194 (Ariz. 2007), cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 923 (2007) (holding that an expert does not admit hearsay or violate the Confrontation 
Clause when the facts underlying his opinion are admissible only to show the basis of that 
opinion and not to prove their truth); State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 955–56 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) 
(holding that conclusions independently derived from the forensic work of others do not 
implicate Melendez-Diaz, and therefore no Confrontation Clause right was violated). 
 66.  See United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 199 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a gang expert 
could not transmit testimonial statements directly to the jury); Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 
N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass. 2009) (holding that a medical examiner could not testify to the 
underlying factual findings of a non-testifying examiner who performed the autopsy); New York 
v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–33 (N.Y. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1159 (2006) (holding 
that out-of-court statements regarding the defendant’s behavior relied upon by the 
prosecution’s expert were inadmissible under Crawford because the trier of fact had to accept 
the statements as true in order to evaluate the expert’s testimony). 
 67.  939 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010). 
 68.  Id. at 282. 
 69.  Id. at 277 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)). 
 70.  Id. at 278–80. 
 71.  Id. at 278. 
 72.  Id. 
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Cellmark tests only to explain how she formed her own opinion.73 
Therefore, “the only statement that the prosecution offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted was Lambatos’s own opinion.”74 
The court agreed with the State, reiterating its previous holdings 
that prohibitions against the admission of hearsay do not apply when 
an expert testifies to underlying facts and data for the purpose of 
explaining the basis of his opinion.75 Here, the court found that 
Lambatos testified to her conclusion based upon her own subjective 
judgment about the comparison of the Cellmark report with the 
defendant’s DNA profile.76 Thus, she used the Cellmark report to 
form the basis of her opinion, in conformity with previous decisions 
and to no abuse of the Confrontation Clause.77 
Second, the court distinguished the Cellmark reports from the 
signed certificates in Melendez-Diaz, emphasizing that the reports 
here were “part of the process used by Lambatos in rendering her 
opinion” rather than a “bare-bones statement.”78 The court therefore 
concluded that the cross-examination of Lambatos satisfied the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee and upheld the appellate court’s decision that 
there was no Confrontation Clause violation.79 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Williams’s Arguments 
Petitioner Sandy Williams argues that the Confrontation Clause 
does not permit the introduction of testimonial statements by a 
forensic analyst through the testimony of a surrogate witness and that 
the State violated the Confrontation Clause by presenting Cellmark’s 
forensic DNA report through the live testimony of Sandra 
Lambatos.80 In his argument, Williams relies upon the decisions in 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, emphasizing that, as in those cases, 
the forensic statements were presented for their truth and fell within 
the scope of the Confrontation Clause’s protections.81 
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 279. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 281–82. 
 79.  Id. at 282. 
 80.  Brief for Petitioner at 9, Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2011). 
 81.  Id. at 10. 
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1. Testimonial Statements 
Williams argues that Cellmark’s forensic report is directly 
analogous to the testimonial forensic reports in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming.82 First, Williams stresses that, as in Melendez-Diaz and in 
Bullcoming, the analysis was done at the request of the police in order 
to assist in investigation and prosecution.83 The resulting report 
qualifies as testimonial, Williams claims, because it was generated for 
an evidentiary purpose—to assist in the prosecution of the case.84 
In contrast to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, however, the 
forensic report here was not itself introduced into evidence.85 Williams 
claims that formal admission of a testimonial statement is not 
necessary for the Confrontation Clause to be implicated, as a 
declarant’s out-of-court statement is “presented” at trial when its 
substance is conveyed through the in-court testimony of another 
witness.86 Because the Confrontation Clause guarantees an 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant regarding any testimonial 
statement used by the prosecution, it does not matter whether that 
testimonial statement is presented verbatim or is merely summarized 
by the in-court witness.87 Williams argues that his confrontation right 
was implicated when “Lambatos conveyed to the trier of fact the 
substance of statements that had been conveyed to her by 
Cellmark.”88 In doing so, Lambatos’s in-court testimony impermissibly 
served as a substitute for “what Cellmark’s analysts would have 
testified to had they testified at trial.”89 
2. Statements Presented for Their Truth 
After concluding that Cellmark’s statements constituted 
testimony, Williams next contends the Illinois Supreme Court erred in 
finding that the statements were presented not for their truth but to 
explain Lambatos’s opinion.90 According to Williams, “[t]he trier of 
fact therefore necessarily had to assess Cellmark’s statements for 
their truth” because they supported Lambatos’s opinion only to the 
 
 82.  Id. at 14. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 15. 
 86.  Id. at 15–16. 
 87.  Id. at 17. 
 88.  Id. at 19. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 20. 
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extent that they were true.91 If the profile reported by Cellmark was 
not “accurately derived from the semen recovered from the [victim], 
Lambatos’s opinion that the two profiles matched had no evidentiary 
value.”92 Because Lambatos’s testimony regarding Cellmark’s report 
was presented to establish the truth of that report, it fell within the 
scope of the Confrontation Clause’s protections.93 
As the Cellmark report was both testimonial and presented for 
the truth of the matter, Williams concludes that affording him the 
right to confront the analysts who performed the tests is the only way 
to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.94 Williams argues that Bullcoming 
“conclusively decided that the Confrontation Clause does not allow 
the testimonial statements of a forensic analyst to be introduced 
through the trial testimony of a surrogate analyst.”95 Cross-examining 
Lambatos during Williams’s trial did not satisfy the Confrontation 
Clause because Lambatos could not describe what particular tests and 
protocols Cellmark’s analysts followed during the “complicated multi-
step process.”96 
3. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 
Last, Williams compares the Confrontation Clause right with 
Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which “allows an expert witness to rely 
on and disclose otherwise inadmissible evidence so long as the 
evidence is ‘of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field.’”97 Williams argues that although the Confrontation 
Clause does not ensure the reliability of the evidence itself, it does 
ensure that the reliability of the evidence is tested under cross-
examination. Accordingly, the constitutional guarantee can only be 
satisfied through confrontation.98 Williams points out, however, that 
because the Confrontation Clause deals only with testimonial 
statements offered for their truth, FRE 703 is not rendered 
inapplicable—it still applies when the statements are not testimonial 
or are not offered for their truth.99 
 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 22. 
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id. at 27. 
 95.  Id. at 24 (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011)). 
 96.  Id. at 25–26. 
 97.  Id. at 28 (quoting Wilson v. Clark, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1326–27 (Ill. 1981) (adopting FRE 
703)). 
 98.  Id. at 29. 
 99.  Id. at 30. 
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B. Illinois’s Arguments 
Respondent Illinois argues that the Confrontation Clause does 
not prohibit opinion testimony of a scientific expert based on outside 
forensic reports that do not constitute hearsay.100 Alternatively, the 
State argues that even if the Cellmark reports are found to be hearsay, 
the judgment below should be affirmed because that hearsay was 
nontestimonial.101 Finally, the State argues that even if there was a 
Confrontation Clause violation, it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.102 
1. Opinion Testimony of a Scientific Expert 
The State argues that Cellmark’s report was permissibly 
introduced to bolster Lambatos’s independent conclusions that 
Petitioner’s DNA profile matched the DNA profile she received from 
Cellmark.103 The State relies on Illinois Rule of Evidence 703, which 
permits an expert witness to base an opinion or inference on facts or 
data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular 
field.104 The State further relies on Melendez-Diaz, claiming that it 
counsels against a requirement that any person involved in the testing 
of the sample be subject to cross-examination.105 Rather than 
amounting to a Sixth Amendment violation, any weakness in the 
witness’s testimony with regard to the data she relied upon should be 
considered in the factfinder’s assessment of what weight to give the 
expert’s opinion.106 
The State distinguishes the facts of Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming from the case at hand by again characterizing Lambatos 
as more than a mere “conduit for the unconstitutional introduction of 
testimonial hearsay.”107 In Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the in-
court witnesses simply parroted the findings of the analysts without 
 
 100.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 11. 
 101.  Id. at 25.  
 102.  Id. at 32. 
 103.  Id. at 12–13. 
 104.  Id. at 13–14. Illinois Rule of Evidence 703 is substantively the same as FRE 703. 
 105.  Id. at 15 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 n.1 (2009) (“[I]t 
is not the case . . . that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of 
custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as 
part of the prosecution’s case.”)). 
 106.  Id. at 15 (“If the prosecution opts not to call a witness who can speak to chain of 
custody, authenticity, or accuracy, this decision may weaken the State’s case, but it is not a Sixth 
Amendment violation.”). 
 107.  See id. at 17–20 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530–31; Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715–16 (2011)). 
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offering any independent opinion.108 In contrast, Lambatos discussed 
Cellmark’s work “only for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining the 
basis of her expert opinion,” as permitted under Crawford.109 Because 
the statements were not offered for their truth, the State argues that 
cross-examining Lambatos was all that was required to satisfy the 
defendant’s confrontation rights.110 
2. Nontestimonial Hearsay 
The State argues alternatively that even if the Court concludes 
that Lambatos’s testimony included hearsay, such hearsay was not 
testimonial.111 In Crawford, the Court established that the 
Confrontation Clause is implicated only when out-of-court testimonial 
statements are admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.112 The 
State argues that machine-generated results, like the 
electropherogram at issue, are not testimonial statements.113 Because 
testimony is defined as a “solemn declaration or affirmation,” and 
solemnity is a human trait, the State concludes that testimony must 
contain the statements of human witnesses.114 Though the production 
of an electropherogram contains some level of human involvement, 
“the machine output at the end of the testing process contains no 
assertion by the employee and is, therefore, not that employee’s 
statement for Confrontation Clause purposes.”115 At most, the 
prosecution introduced raw data generated by a machine as the basis 
for the testimony of an expert witness.116 
The State also argues that Cellmark’s report does not qualify as a 
testimonial statement subject to the Confrontation Clause because it 
does not pass the primary purpose test established in Michigan v. 
Bryant.117 In contrast with the forensic reports in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, Cellmark’s report was produced not for “the primary 
purpose of creating evidence for use at trial,” but for “facilitating 
 
 108.  Id. at 18 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530–31; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715–
16). 
 109.  Id. at 21. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 25. 
 112.  Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004)). 
 113.  Id. at 26. 
 114.  Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115.  Id. at 27. 
 116.  Id. at 28. 
 117.  Id. 
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further forensic analysis.”118 The State distinguishes Cellmark’s report 
from the reports in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming in two ways. First, 
the Cellmark report did not contain any formality, such as a 
certification or an oath, which would suggest that it was created with a 
primary purpose of being introduced at trial.119 Second, the report was 
comprised of documents that could be understood only by other 
scientists and would be meaningless to the factfinder in this case.120 In 
contrast, the reports in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming contained 
citations to court rules or statutory provisions that allowed them to 
serve as substantive evidence at trial.121 The State argues that because 
the report could not serve as an alternative to trial testimony, it likely 
was not made with that purpose in mind, and thus does not constitute 
testimony subject to the Confrontation Clause.122 
3. Harmless Error 
Finally, the State argues that even if the trial court erred in 
admitting any part of Lambatos’s testimony, the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.123 The State contends that “Lambatos’s 
testimony was independent of the victim’s credible and unequivocal 
identification” of Williams, in a line-up and at trial, as the man who 
attacked her.124 The trial judge specifically discussed the strength and 
credibility of the victim’s identifications and announced that he was 
not influenced by any “perceived infallibility of DNA analysis or 
evidence.”125 Thus, even if the Court concludes that the trial court 
erred in admitting Lambatos’s testimony, the error was harmless and 
the judgment should stand.126 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
Williams v. Illinois presents an opportunity for the Court to decide 
whether its newly constructed Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, 
established in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, will be extended or 
curtailed. Like the cases before it, Williams will turn on the specifics 
 
 118.  Id. at 29. 
 119.  Id. at 30. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 31. 
 123.  Id. at 32. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 33. 
 126.  Id. 
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of the facts presented and the Court likely will not issue a broad 
holding.127 First, the Court will have to decide whether the report at 
hand constituted testimony for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the Court will focus on whether Lambatos truly came to an 
“independent opinion” using Cellmark’s report. Finally, the Court 
may also consider the repercussions of extending the Confrontation 
Clause too far and may be wary of issuing an opinion that conflicts 
with evidentiary rules and public policy considerations. 
Both Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming were decided by 5-4 
majorities, with Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Roberts, and Alito 
dissenting. These four Justices likely will maintain their stance that 
“requiring the State to call the technician who filled out a form and 
recorded the results of a test is a hollow formality” and no Sixth 
Amendment violation occurs when that technician is not called.128 
Justices Ginsburg and Scalia are equally likely to continue to extend 
the Confrontation doctrine crafted in the opinions they issued in the 
previous two cases. Thus, the outcome of Williams likely hinges on the 
votes of Justice Sotomayor, who voiced concern over a similar 
situation in her concurrence in Bullcoming,129 and Justice Thomas, who 
placed an emphasis on the formalities attending the statements in 
Melendez-Diaz.130 
A. The Court Likely Will Find the Cellmark Report to be Testimonial 
Although the State urges that, without a certification or oath, 
Cellmark’s report was “informal” and served no direct evidentiary 
purpose, the Court is unlikely to find this argument persuasive.131 The 
Court specifically declared in Bryant that “[f]ormality is not the sole 
touchstone of our primary purpose inquiry.”132 Thus, even though the 
report did not have an official certificate or oath, the Court likely will 
look beyond formalities to the primary purpose of the report’s 
creation. 
Here, arguing that the report was made for any reason other than 
for aiding the investigation and prosecution of a crime would be an 
uphill battle. The DNA profile was made at the behest of the police in 
 
 127.  See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2719 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing the limited reach of the Court’s holding). 
 128.  Id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 129.  Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 130.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 131.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 30. 
 132.  Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011). 
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connection with a specific crime and was not part of any routine 
gathering of medical information.133 As in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, the analysts tested the evidence and submitted a report 
of their results to the police.134 It is no great logical leap to conclude 
that the police requested the analysis in order to assist in the 
investigation and prosecution of the victim’s attacker. Moreover, 
Lambatos explicitly testified at trial that “all reports in this case were 
prepared for this criminal investigation [and] the eventual litigation 
here.”135 Because the report was made for an evidentiary purpose to 
assist in the prosecution of the case, it should satisfy Bryant’s primary 
purpose test and rank as testimonial.136 
Justice Thomas may argue that, without formalities, this report 
does not “fall within the core class of testimonial statements governed 
by the Confrontation Clause.”137 In contrast, Richard Friedman, 
amicus for Petitioner Williams, argues that the very fact that the 
statement was made to assist in the prosecution implicates the 
purpose of the Confrontation Clause, and “a court should guard 
against allowing the statement to be used to prove a matter that it 
asserted without the witness who made the statement . . . being 
subjected to confrontation.”138 
Recently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Derr v. 
State,139 a case similar to Williams. Although not binding on the 
Supreme Court, the Maryland court’s approach is helpful in analyzing 
the same theories that may be applied in Williams. The court in Derr 
found that the DNA profile report introduced at trial constituted 
testimony because “the DNA profile and report are made for the 
primary purpose of establishing facts relevant to a later prosecution, 
and an objective analyst would understand that the statements will be 
used in a later trial.”140 The court also rejected the theory that machine 
 
 133.  See Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 15, 
Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2011) (suggesting a physician requesting routine 
blood tests to help him form an opinion in anticipation of testimony would not raise a 
Confrontation Clause problem). 
 134.  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
 135.  Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 
133, at 14 n.8. 
 136.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 14. 
 137.  Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 138.  Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 
133, at 16. 
 139.  29 A.3d 533 (Md. 2011). 
 140.  Id. at 549. 
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products are not testimonial and relied on Bullcoming to hold that 
the testimonial statement includes not only the scientific results, but 
also the underlying process or procedure.141 Thus, the only way to 
satisfy the Confrontation Clause is to afford the defendant the right 
to cross-examine the analyst who in fact performed the testing, 
allowing any “lapses or lies” to be exposed.142 
B. The Court Likely Will Find Lambatos’s Opinion to be Dependent 
upon the Report 
The question of whether Lambatos offered her own truly 
“independent opinion,” as characterized by Justice Sotomayor in 
Bullcoming, is intrinsically tied to the question of whether the report 
was presented for its truth or merely presented to bolster Lambatos’s 
opinion.143 This opinion was uncontestably based, at least in part, on 
the Cellmark report. Lambatos used the DNA profile Cellmark 
produced to reach the further conclusion that Williams’s DNA 
matched that found on the vaginal swabs.144 Without Cellmark’s 
report, this conclusion could not have been drawn.145 Thus, Lambatos’s 
opinion was “independent” in the sense that she came to a new 
conclusion: the two profiles matched. Nonetheless, this conclusion was 
completely dependent on the report provided to her. A more fitting 
characterization, then, is that put forth by amicus: that Lambatos 
provided “added value” to the Cellmark report.146 
Rather than simply transmitting its contents to the factfinder, 
Lambatos provided added value to the report by using it to conclude 
that the DNA profiles matched.147 This use does not match up exactly 
to the scenario contemplated by Justice Sotomayor, which posits an 
expert presenting an independent opinion about the very data at 
issue.148 Instead, Lambatos relied on the opinion of the analyst who 
 
 141.  Id. at 553–54 (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2011)). 
 142.  Id. at 554 (quoting Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715). 
 143.  See Richard Friedman, Initial Thoughts on Williams, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG 
(July 9, 2011, 2:26 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/07/initial-thoughts-on-
williams.html. 
 144.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 20. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 
133, at 18. 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (explaining that “the State 
does not assert that [the expert] offered an independent, expert opinion about Bullcoming’s 
blood alcohol concentration,” where the blood alcohol test was the testimony at issue).  
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had actually performed the initial test and provided no additional 
insight about the DNA profile analysis performed.149 
Because Lambatos used Cellmark’s report to draw her conclusion, 
presuming that the report was not presented for its truth would 
constitute a logical fallacy.150 Other courts and scholars recognize the 
incoherency of this argument as well, stating, for example, “[t]he 
distinction between a statement offered for its truth and a statement 
offered to shed light on an expert’s opinion is not meaningful in this 
context.”151 The present case provides a perfect illustration of this 
principle. Proof that Williams’s DNA matched the DNA found on the 
vaginal swabs required three elements: proof that the DNA profile on 
the vaginal swabs was accurate, proof that Petitioner’s DNA profile 
was accurate, and proof that the matching analysis was accurate.152 If 
“the trier of fact did not accept as true” any one of these elements, 
Lambatos’s opinion had no evidentiary value.153 Thus, the trier of fact 
necessarily had to consider the truth of Lambatos’s testimony 
regarding the Cellmark report in order to evaluate her opinion, and 
the testimony fell within the scope of the Confrontation Clause’s 
protections.154 
C. Avoiding Possible Conflicts with the Federal Rules of Evidence 
The Court should be able to find that Williams had a right to 
confront the analyst who performed the test without creating a 
conflict between the Confrontation Clause and Federal Rule of 
Evidence 703 for three reasons. 
First, evidentiary doctrine and the Confrontation Clause involve 
two separate bodies of law: the evidentiary rule is concerned chiefly 
with reliability, whereas the Confrontation Clause has been expressly 
interpreted as rejecting the reliability test in favor of requiring testing 
 
 149.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 26 (“That Lambatos reviewed one of 
Cellmark’s electropherograms does not make her opinion somehow independent of Cellmark’s 
work. . . . Lambatos’s opinion was completely dependent on Cellmark’s analysts having 
performed the analysis correctly.”). 
 150.  See id. at 20 (“[T]he ‘not-for-its-truth’ rationale is logically incoherent where such 
statements support the expert’s opinion only to the extent that they are true . . . .”). 
 151.  People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–33 (N.Y. 2005); see also People v. Dungo, 98 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the 
Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791, 816 (2007). 
 152.  Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 
133, at 18. 
 153.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 22. 
 154.  Id. 
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by cross-examination.155 The rule does not purport to abrogate a 
constitutional provision through hearsay exceptions. Second, the 
evidentiary rule would still operate to allow an expert to testify to an 
inference drawn from one or more testimonial statements when those 
statements are not disclosed or discussed during trial.156 The 
Confrontation Clause is only at issue when, as here, the expert clearly 
bases his or her opinion on a report generated by a named outside 
source. Third, the Confrontation Clause is implicated only when a 
prosecution expert offers an opinion based on a testimonial statement 
made by an outside source.157 Reports prepared by technicians 
without any contemplation of assisting in a prosecution would be 
unaffected, as these statements do not qualify as testimony under the 
Bryant test.158 Thus, even if the Court finds a Sixth Amendment 
violation in this case, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 need not be found 
unconstitutional or rendered inapplicable. 
In conclusion, the Court is likely to extend its holdings in 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming and find a Sixth Amendment 
violation here. Though the facts of this case differ only subtly from 
those of the previous cases, the difference is one that the Court has 
implicitly acknowledged as worth addressing. The Court should seize 
the opportunity to seal yet another gap in Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence and continue in its “rather straightforward 
application”159 of Crawford doctrine. 
 
 
 155.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 n.1 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“The rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause, are designed primarily to 
police reliability; the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to determine whether statements 
are testimonial and therefore require confrontation.”). 
 156.  See Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 133, at 11–12, n.5.  
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